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Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Obligations in Small Business
Deana Nance and Joseph D. Vu

This paper discusses the issue of shareholder liabiHty for corporate obUgations
in small business. Although the law allows individuals to incorporate their
businesses to lim it liabilities, the courts have in many cases pierced the corporate
veil and held shareholders liable for obligations of the corporation. The doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil rarely affects shareholders of publicly-traded firms.
In most cases, this doctrine would only reach shareholders of small, closely held
firms. While fraud or unjust intent provide reasons for the court to disregard
corporate entity, oftentimes the honest but uninformed actions of shareholders
are to blame. T o maintain limited liability, shareholders of small businesses must
act in accordance with die corporate form of ownership in representing the firm,
managing the firm’s assets, and financing the firm.

I. INTRODUCTION
Limited liability is often cited as an advantage of the corporate form of
business organization. The law allows individuals to incorporate their
businesses to shield them in such a way that their maximum loss is limited
to their capital contribution to the corporation. To take advantage of this
legal provision, proprietors often decide to incorporate their businesses.
However, the courts have in many cases pierced the “corporate veil” and held
shareholders liable for obligations of the corporation. Typically, these
situations only happen to small, closely-held corporations. Conrad [1]
conducted a corporate census of American firms and found that the majority
of corporations are small, whether measured by assets, revenues, or number
of shareholders. Conrad estimated that 90% of American corporations have
fewer than ten shareholders, and that 99% of all corporations have fewer than
100 shareholders. These numbers suggest that the corporate finance literature
should pay attention to the problems and important issues of small
corporations. While fraud or unjust intent provide reasons for the court to
disregard the corporate entity, oftentimes the honest but uninformed actions
of shareholders are to blame. This paper will focus on the latter of these
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situations. To maintain limited liability, shareholders must act in accordance
with the corporate form of ownership in representing the firm, managing
the firm’s assets, and financing the firm.
II. CORPORATE REPRESENTATION
In sole proprietorships the distinction between business and personal
activities is often blurred. Because the proprietor is liable for the obligations
of the business and income from operation is taxable to the individual at
personal income tax rates, there is little motivation to distinguish between
personal and business activities. When the proprietorship is incorporated,
the natural tendency is to continue to operate the corporation as a personal
business, intertwining personal dealings with those of the new corporation.
Treating the corporation as a personal business constitutes a disregard for
the corporate entity by the shareholder and is likely to result in the court’s
disregard for the corporate entity as well.
The courts have generally failed to protect shareholders from third-party
claims when they chose to carry on their incorporated business as individuals
or as partners. The shareholder may be found to be acting in his capacity
as an individual proprietor or a member of a partnership rather than as an
employee of the corporation if he does not represent himself to third parties
as such. This applies to both oral and written communication. The
shareholder who does not make clear to third parties that they are dealing
with the corporation, rather than the shareholder individually may be
endangering the corporate entity. Thus letterhead used in corporate
communication should reflect the name of the corporation rather than the
name of the shareholder or of the formerly unincorporated proprietorship.
Separation of the individual from the corporation is also reflected in a distinct
corporate address, telephone number, and checking account. Failure to
maintain a separation between the personal business of the shareholder and
the business of the corporation is likely to result in the court’s disregard for
the corporate entity.
The shareholder who exercises complete domination and control of the
corporation is likely to be found conducting business as an individual rather
than as a corporation. If the shareholder consistently makes business
decisions and conducts financial transactions without consulting other
directors or officers, the corporation may be found to be merely an instrument
through which the shareholder conducts his personal business affairs. Under
the instrumentality rule, the shareholder is not protected by the corporate
form and is liable for corporate obligations.
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Representing the business as a corporation also requires adhering to
corporate formahties and recognizing corporate rules and duties as specified
in the bylaws. Legal requirements of the state must be followed in the initial
incorporation of the company including actually paying in the amount of
paid-in capital specified in the Articles of Incorporation. Board meetings are
to be held and attended and minutes from meetings kept on file. Corporate
legal and accounting records are to be properly maintained and kept separate
from those of any other business or individual.
While following corporate rules and formalities may in some ways
restrict or lessen the autonomy of the shareholder/manager, it is nevertheless
necessary if the corporate entity is to be preserved and the shareholder’s
personal liability limited. One such corporate requirement, which is
sometimes overlooked or neglected, is the issuance of stock. The failure to
issue stock is often a contributing factor in the decision to disregard the
corporate entity. While usually insufficient in itself, when accompanied by
a lack of paid-in-capital, inadequate capitalization, incomplete organization,
or individual domination, the failure to issue stock may result in piercing
the corporate veil. However, this is one area in which state laws differ and
in some jurisdictions there is no requirement that stock be issued before
beginning corporate operations.
The rights and privileges of corporate ownership may be jeopardized
if the corporation is not represented and run distinctly from other affiliated
incorporated or unincorporated businesses. The shareholder who has ties to
multiple businesses will not be shielded from liability if each corporation
does not have its unique business purpose and is not operated separately from
the others. Thus, in Mull v. Colt Cp. (1962, DC NY) 31 FRD154, stockholders
were found to be doing business as individuals rather than as a corporation
because incorporated businesses each owned two taxicabs, garaged them
together, and were completely controlled by the parent corporation. This
is an example of the court holding the shareholder liable for the obligations
of a single business operation which is divided into multiple corporations
solely for the purpose of shielding the shareholder or parts of the business
from liability.
III.

ASSET MANAGEMENT

Mismanagement of the firm’s tangible and financial assets may provide
grounds for the court’s disregard of the corporate entity. The classic Jensen
and Meckling [3] agency problem arises when the shareholder is also the
manager of a partially debt-financed firm. Conflicts of interest exist between
the shareholder/manager and the debtholders regarding investment.
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dividends and risk. Some of these conflicts may be more pronounced in the
closely held corporation.
There is also the potential for underinvestment (See Myers, [4]). The
shareholder/manager may reject a positive net present value if the resulting
value of the firm would not be sufficient to cover the claims of the
debtholders. Therefore, the project will be rejected even if it increases the
value of the debt. The greater the debt outstanding, the greater is the potential
for underinvestment.
The shareholder will also prefer greater dividends than the debtholders.
In the closely held corporation, dividends are only one of the many forms
that distributions to shareholders can take. As manager, the shareholder has
the ability to transfer real or financial assets from the corporation to himself.
Distributions from the corporation to the shareholder lessen the coverage
of debt claims, thus the wealth of the shareholder increases at the expense
of the debtholders.
One conflict which presents itself in publicly held corporations is less
evident in the closely held firm. The shareholders in a publicly held firm
prefer more risk than the debtholders because the shaireholders have a claim
which is like an option on the value of the firm. However, the shareholder/
manager of the closely held corporation holds a poorly diversified portfolio
and will, therefore, be more risk averse than the shareholder of a publicly
held firm. He will, therefore, have incentive to purchase insurance, hedge,
and undertake other risk reduction strategies which debtholders will find to
be mutually beneficial. (See Nance, Smith, and Smithson, [5]).
Monitoring management may prevent or control wealth transfers.
However, some of the traditional forms of monitoring are not available in
the closely held corporation. For instance, the financial statements of the
closely held firm do not have to be audited. The closely held corporation
seldom uses bond financing, so bond radng agencies do not monitor the
company. There is also less monitoring of the closely held firm because its
stock is not publicly traded. The closely held firm is not required to make
disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Because controls or restrictions under which the shareholder/manager
operates may be fewer in the closely held corporation, there are fewer
impediments to transferring wealth from the debtholder to the shareholder.
While the job of the manager of a publicly held company may be threatened
due to unacceptable performance, the shareholder/manager of the closely
held firms likely to have complete job security regardless of his actions. While
bond covenants may restrict the actions of the manager of the publicly held
firm, it is more likely that any restrictions on the manager of the closely held
firm will take the form of loan agreements with banks. Such agreements
provide a degree of protection for the bank but the firm’s other creditors may
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Still suffer a loss in the value of their claims due to actions taken by the
shareholder/manager.

The courts have recognized the conflicts which exist between the
shareholder/manager and the corporation’s creditors and have in many cases
disregarded the corporate entity due to transfers of wealth from debtholders
to the shareholders resulting from the mishandling of corporate assets. The
court has often cited either the stripping or the personal use of corporate
assets by the shareholder as examples of improper treatment.
Stripping the corporation of assets is one shareholder activity which has
been frequently noted by the courts in their decision to hold the shareholder
liable for corporate obligations. For instance, the shareholder is stripping
the corporation of assets and expropriating wealth from the debtholders if
he borrows money in the corporate name and then proceeds to distribute
excessive sums from the corporation to himself and/or family members. The
courts have ruled that corporate profits are to be made available to meet
obligations to the firm’s debtholders before distributions are made to the
shareholders. In cases where the shareholder is also a creditor, the value of
the other creditors’ claims would be reduced if the corporation repays loans
to the shareholders before repaying loans to other debtholders.
Ceteris paribus, debtholders prefer lower dividends and shareholder
salaries than do shareholders. While paying excessive dividends and salaries
is one form of asset stripping, it is not the only form of asset stripping which
the courts have recognized. The sale of corporate assets to the shareholder
or another of his businesses at below market value prices could be construed
as asset stripping. Paying personal obligations out of corporate bank
acccounts or withdrawing sums in excess of the stated salary are examples
of more blatsmt forms of asset stripping.
Asset stripping sometimes occurs when the firm is in financial distress
or has a large claim against it pending and bankruptcy looms. The
shareholder has in some cases transferred assets from the corporation to
himself to protect the assets from the claims of third parties. The
shareholder’s wealth thereby increases at the expense of the debtholders. Prior
cases have shown that the courts regard asset stripping as evidence of the
shareholder’s disregard for the corporate entity and will, therefore, hold the
shareholder liable for the corporation’s debts.
Instead of stripping assets from the corporation, the shareholder may
try to avoid financial responsibility by transferring assets to the corporation.
That is, the shareholder may transfer tangible or financial assets from his
personal name into the name of the corporation to protect himself from the
claims of a personal creditor from an ex-spouse in a divorce settlement. The
corporation is not to be used as a shield to protect an individual from
promises or agreements he has made with third parties, thus the shareholder
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will not avoid personal liability for his obligations by transferring personal
assets to the corporation.
The use of corporate financial or tangible assets for personal purposes
is the second activity associated with asset management which is often
mentioned by the courts in their decision to disregard the corporate entity.
Using corporate funds to discharge personal obligations or using corporateowned real estate without paying rent are evidence that corporate assets are
being used for personal purposes. The personal use of corporate assets may
also take the form of the intermingling of personal and corporate funds or
the intermingling of corporate funds with those of another business. The
exclusive use and control of corporate assets by one individual may also
provide reason for the court to rule that corporate assets are being used for
personal purposes. Furthermore, it may appear that corporate assets are being
put to personal use if they are registered in the name of the shareholder rather
than the name of the corporation.
Evidence of asset stripping or the personal use of corporate assets does
not have to be accompanied by fraudulent purpose or unjust intent as
improper asset management has been sufficient in itself to result in the court’s
disregard of the corporate entity. Shareholders of previously unincorporated
firms may be prone to take asset management lightly because there is less
reason to distinguish and maintain a separateness between business and
personal assets in the unincorporated firm. The shareholder of a small firm
with one or a relatively few shareholders may be more prone to asset stripping
or using corporate assets for personal purposes simply because there is likely
to be little or no disagreement within the firm regarding the use and disposal
of assets. However, the debtholders, employees, suppliers, and customers also
have direct or indirect claims on the firm and may seek restitution from the
court for damages or unfulfilled obligations of the firm resulting from
improper asset management.
IV. FINANCING OF THE FIRM
To preserve the corporate entity, the firm must be sufficiently capitalized and
corporate debt or obligations must be separate from those of the shareholder.
Lenders, realizing the potential for asset stripping or the diversion of funds
from the corporation to the shareholder, will often require that the
shareholder co-sign for corporate loans. The courts have ruled that the
shareholder who guarantees the debt of the corporation either verbally or
in writing has given up the protection afforded by the corporate entity and
will be held personally liable. Paying even a single installment of a corporate
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obligation with a personal check from the shareholder is an indication that
the shareholder is assuming responsibility for the entire obligation.
In small firms a shareholder often provides infusions of capital to
finance one or more of the corporation’s projects. While it is acceptable for
the shareholder to provide loans, gross undercapitalization of the firm and
the resulting dependence on the stockholder to maintain continuing
operations may signify that the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder.
Inadequate or undercapitalization of the corporation has been cited as a
contributing factor in the court’s decision to disregard the corporate entity.
Whether the firm is undercapitalized is a judgement call by the court.
In the case of Wheeler vs. Superior Mortgage Co. (1961) 196 Cal App 2d 822,
17 Cal Rptr 291, the court remarked that “if the capital is illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the risk of loss, this is a ground
for denying the separate entity privilege.” In this particular case, the
corporation was capitalized for only $30. Undercapitalization may even be
considered fraudulent if it is persistent and endangers the claims of
debtholders.
Loans between the shareholder and the corporation should be armslength transactions. Loans without accompanying promissory notes or no
interest loans made to the corporation. The courts may construe this to mean
that the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder. To maintain the
corporate identity, shareholder loans to the corporation must be properly
recorded as such on the corporation’s books, and a repayment schedule for
principal and interest decided upon and followed.
The holders of bad debts of the closely held firms are often the parties
who seek to pierce the corporate veil as a means of gaining access to the
shareholder’s personal assets. However, even the all-equity firm is not
immune to attempts by outside parties to break the corporate shield and hold
the shareholder personally liable. Employees, customers, and the estate of
the shareholder are among the potential claimants. For instance, an employee
may sue due to an on-the-job accident, or a customer may sue due to bodily
injuries or property damage caused by the firm’s product.
Therefore, even the firm with no outstanding debt has reason to take
precautions to maintain the corporate identity through proper representa
tion, asset management, and financing.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the issue of shareholder liability for corporate
obligations in small business. Although the law allows individuals to
incorporate their businesses to limit liabilities, the courts have in many cases
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pierced the corporate veil and held shareholders liable for obligations of.the
corporations. State laws and individual cases differ so it is impossible to
compile a complete list of what actions should be taken (or not taken) in
order to preserve the corporate benefit of limited personal liability. Court
decisions are based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The actions
noted above are not an all-inclusive “to do” list but are rather intended to
serve as a guideline based upon the court’s previous decisions to pierce the
corporate veil. While any one of the actions discussed above may not
constitute disregard of the corporate entity, any one or more may together
be construed as such. A direct implication for a small business owner is to
be aware of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and to determine if
certain measures would be appropriate to preserve the corporate benefit of
limited personal liability.
In practice, it is unlikely that shareholders of a publicly-traded firm
would bear personal liability for corporate obligations. In most cases, the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil would only reach shareholders of
small, closely-held firms. Piercing the corporate veil is a form of unlimited
liability. The issue is to decide in which particular cases, and for how much,
shareholders are held personally liable. This is an interesting area for future
research in small business.
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